A nonmonotonic logic of thresholded gener alizations is presented. Given propositions a and {3 from a language L and a posi tive integer k, the thresholded generalization a =}k {3 means that the conditional prob ability 1r(f3!a) is at least 1 -7jl8k.
A nonmonotonic logic of thresholded gener alizations is presented. Given propositions a and {3 from a language L and a posi tive integer k, the thresholded generalization a =}k {3 means that the conditional prob ability 1r(f3!a) is at least 1 -7jl8k. A two level probability structure is defined. At the lower level, a model is defined to be a prob ability function on L. At the upper level, there is a probability distribution over mod els. A definition is given of what it means for a collection of thresholded generaliza tions to entail another thresholded general ization. This nonmonotonic entailment re lation, called entailment in probability, has the feature that its conclusions are proba bilistically trustworthy meaning that, given true premises, it is improbable that an en tailed conclusion would be false. A proce dure is presented for ascertaining whether any given collection of premises entails any given conclusion. It is shown that entailment in probability is closely related to Goldszmidt and Pearl's System-z+, thereby demonstrat ing that System-Z+'s conclusions are proba bilistically trustworthy.
INTRODUCTION

GENERALIZATIONS
By a generalization is meant any statement of the type:
Nearly everything that has property a also has property {3. Examples: (a) Nearly every animal that has feath ers is capable of flight. (b) On nearly every occasion when I turn the key in my car ignition, the car st arts.
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In a logic of generalizations, collections of premises which are generalizations entail conclusions which are also generalizations. Why is a logic of generalizations needed? Why does one need to infer new, previously unknown, generalizations from already known general izations? The reason is that the known generalizations may not be adequate to give unambiguous answers to questions about individual objects.
For example, suppose that, among the known general izations, are:
(i) Nearly everything that has property a also has property J.
(ii) Nearly everything that has property f] also has property not---y.
If all that is known about an object o is that it has property a, then it should be concluded that, in all probability, o has property --y. But what if it is known that o has both property o: and property {3 (and nothing more is known about o)? What should be concluded then?1 By the principle of total evidence (Schurz, 1994) , the conclusion that o has property 'Y should be accepted as probably true if and only if it is known that:
(iii) Nearly everything having properties a and {3 also has property 'Y· Thus, it is desired to know whether (iii) is true, but (iii) is not one of the known generalizations. This illustrates why a logic of generalizations is needed. The generalization (iii) should be judged to be true if and only if it is entailed by the known generalizations.
THRESHOLDED GENERALIZATIONS
The exception rate for a generalization Nearly every thing that has property a also has property {3 is defined to be one minus the conditional probability of {3 given 1This is a version of the reference class problem (Bac chus, Grove, Halpern & Koller, 1992).
Bamber a:. A generalization is said to be thresholded if it is ac companied by the the information that its exception rate is less than some particular threshold.
It is useful to threshold generalizations for two rea sons. First, it helps in gauging how much confidence to place in inferences about individual objects. Thus, suppose that all that is known about an object o is that it has property a:. Given the generalization Nearly ev erything that has property a: also has property (3, how confident should one be that o has property (3? The answer is that, the smaller the generalization's thresh old, the more confidence one may have. Second, the thresholds attached to premises affect what conclu sions are entailed by them. For example, whether or not the generalizations (i) and (ii) entail the general ization (iii) depends upon the thresholds attached to (i) and (ii). If (i)'s threshold is much smaller than (ii) 's threshold, then (iii) will be entailed; otherwise, it will not be entailed.
A nonmonotonic logic of thresholded generalizations will be described in this paper.
2
SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS
In this paper, object properties will be represented by propositions in a propositional language. 
The convention expressed by Eq. 2 is controversial. Thus, Adams adopted this convention in the papers (Adams, 1966 (Adams, , 1986 but not in his book (Adams, 1975 
ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION
As discussed above, propositions in £ are interpreted here as properties of objects and 7r(/31o:) is interpreted as the conditional probability of an object having the property (3 given that it has the property a:. Alter natively, propositions in £ may be interpreted as as sertions of fact and 7r(f31o:) may be interpreted as the conditional probability of the assertion (3 being true given that the assertion a: is true. The logic presented in this paper is appropriate for either of the above in terpretations.
Thresholded generalizations resemble conditional statements in Adams' (1966 Adams' ( , 1975 Adams' ( , 1986 ) logic of con ditionals. An Adams conditional is a syntactic object of the form a: --+ (3 where a: and (3 are are propositions.
Its meaning is that 7r(/31o:) is close to one, where a and (3 are interpreted as assertions.
this paper for the following reason: The logic presented in this paper is intended for use in applications where rr(o:) = 0 only if the set of objects having property a is empty. Consequently, Eq. 2 guarantees that rr(/11o:) = 1 if and only if the objects having property a are a subset of the objects having property /3.
GOALS
This paper has two major goals. The first goal is to formulate a nonmonotonic entailment relation, to be called entailment in probability, for thresholded gener alizations. As a stepping stone toward the definition of entailment in probability, a monotonic entailment re lation called entailment with certainty will be defined.
The second goal is to find a procedure for ascertain ing whether any given collection of premises and any given conclusion satisfy the definition of entailment in probability.
ENTAILMENT CRITERIA
Classical logic uses the following criterion for entail ment.
Criterion 1 (Classical) For a set of premises to en tail a conclusion, it should be impossible for the con clusion to be false when the premises are true. Thus, every model of the premises should be a model of the conclusion. In short, any entailed conclusion should be trustworthy.
Any entailment relation that satisfies this classical cri terion will necessarily be monotonic. Criterion 2 (Modified Classical) For a set of premises to entail a conclusion, it should be im probable that the conclusion would be false when the premises are true. Thus, nearly every model of the premises should be a model of the conclusion. In short, any entailed conclusion should be probabilisti cally trustworthy.
Most of our everyday reasoning does not satisfy the classical criterion for entailment. We continually leap to conclusions that are not fully certain given the premises from which we are reasoning. Indeed our rea soning would be virtually paralyzed if we used only the classical criterion for entailment. Perhaps, in our ev eryday reasoning, we frequently use the modified clas sical criterion.
As formulated above, the modified classical criterion is imprecise. It shall be one of the goals of this paper to rigorously and precisely define a nonmonotonic entail ment relation that embodies the spirit of the modified classical criterion.
MONOTONIC ENTAILMENT
We will now work toward defining, fi rst, a monotonic entailment relation and, later, a nonmonotonic entail ment relation for thresholded generalizations. Recall that the thresholded generalization a �k (3 means
where 6 is a positive number close to zero and 'ljJ is a positive number that we hope is not very far from one. The definitions of these entailment relations will be idealizations in two ways. First, because 6 is close to zero, the definitions will involve looking at asymptotes as b goes to zero. Second, because the value of 'ljJ is unknown, the definitions will not depend upon 'ljJ having any particular value or range of values.
4.1
MODELS Definition 3 A model is a probability fu nction on .C. Let M denote the set of all models. Suppose that 1r is a model and that 'ljJ > 0 and 6 > 0. Then 7T satis fies the thresholded generalization a �k (3 under the parameters ( 'ljJ, b) if and only if
Define M'l,i,,o(a �k 8) to be the set of models that satisfy a �k (3 under the parameters ('1/J, 6).
Notation 4 Throughout the remainder of this paper, let A denote the set of m 2: 0 thresholded generaliza tions: 
4.2
CONSISTENCY
Abbreviation 6 Let S(6) be any statement involving 6. Throughout this paper, (a) and (b) will be used as abbreviations for (c). (c) There exists a 6. > 0 such that, for all positive 6 <;:: 6., S(b).
Proposition/Definition 7 Either (a) or (b) is true.
(a) For every positive parameter vector W and every positive 6, Mq; , 6(A) is not empty. In this case, A is said to be consistent. 
(a) A is consistent and, for every positive parameter vector qi, Entailment with certainty will not be fully character ized here. It has been introduced primarily as a step ping stone toward the definition of a nonmonotonic entailment relation to be called entailment in proba bility.
NONMONOTONIC ENTAILMENT
A nonmonotonic entailment relation for thresholded generalizations will now be constructed by taking the requirements for monotonic entailment and making them less stringent. Loosely speaking, instead of re quiring a conclusion to be satisfied by every model that satisfies the premises, it will only be required that the conclusion be satisfied by nearly every model that satisfies the premises. This strategy for defin ing a nonmonotonic entailment relation is inspired by the random-worlds and random-structures meth ods (Bacchus, Grove, Halpern & Koller, 1992 , 1993 , 1996 Grove, Halpern & Koller, 1994 , 1996a , 1996b .
PROBABILITY ORDER
The concept of probability order and the notation Op( · )
were introduced by Mann and Wald (194;)) and elab orated by Chernoff (1956) and Pratt (1959) . A nice tutorial is presented by Bishop, Fienberg and Holland (1975 
MODELS AS VECTORS
Following Nilsson (1986) and Paris (1994, pp. 13-14) , probability functions may be represented as points in a finite-dimensional space. Recall that the language .C contains 2r atoms. Therefore, to specify a probabil ity function (i.e., model) 1r on C, it suffices to spec ify the value of 1r(at) for each atom at E C. There fore, any model may be represented by a vector in 2r dimensional space. The components of such a vector will all be non-negative and will sum to one. The set of models M is represented by a (2r-I)-dimensional polytope, namely, the convex hull of the 2r unit axis vectors.
These two views of models will be used interchange ably throughout this paper. Sometimes a model will be considered to be a probability function and some times a vector. 
ENTAILMENT IN PROBABILITY
We want to define entailment in probability so that, loosely speaking, A entails ""( =;,1 ( in probability if and only if nearly every model that satisfies each thresh olded generalization in A also satisfies ""( =;,1 (.
When is one justified in asserting that nearly every model in M>ii 6(A) has some particular attribute C There are two' cases to consider. First, suppose that A is consistent and, therefore, M>ii )A) is not empty.
If the probability that the random model II� , has
attribute � is close to one, then it is reasonable to say that nearly every model in M$,6(A) has attribute �· 3 This method of ad opting a uniform distribution over models is similar to the random-structures method (Bac chus, Grove, Halpern & Koller, 1992; Grove, Halpern & Koller, 1996a , 1996b . In this method, a structure is an allocation of N � 1 indistinguishable objects among 2r
atoms. Thus, a structure may be represented by a vector of 2r non-negative integers that sum to N. Each struc ture is assigned equal probability. Let XN denote a ran domly selected structure. As N --> oo, the distribution of XN / N approaches a uniform distribution. The goal of the random-structures method is to find the asymptotic condi tional probability of a sentence <p being satisfied given that a sentence () was satisfied. 
Proposition 16 A entails ""( =;,J ( in probability if and only if either (a) or (b).
(a) A is consistent and, for every po sitive parameter vector � and ever y TJ > 0, there exists a 1/J > 0 such that for small6.
(b) .A is inconsistent.
Loosely speaking, Proposition 16 says that A entails ""( =;,1 ( in probability if and only if nearly every model that satisfies A also satisfies "/ =?J (. Not surprisingly, it turns out that entailment in probability is nonmono tonic.
Definition 15 and Proposition 16 which define and characterize entailment in probability are stochastic analogs of Definition 9 and Proposition 10 which de fine and characterize entailment with certainty. Thus, Eq. 8 is the stochastic analog of Eq. 6 and Eq. 9 is the stochastic analog of Eq. 7.
ROBUSTNESS
In essence, the definition of entailment in probability is Bayesian.
Recall that the set M of all models is a polytope in 2r -dimensional space. The dimension of M � 6 (A) may decrease as 6 goes to zero. Let F denote the lowest dimension face of M-see Webster ( 1994, pp. 79-80) for the definition of face-that eventually contains M>ii 6(A) as[; goes to zero. Let ft denote the uniform dist�ibution on .F. Then, for small 8, Eq. 9 may be rewritten with a posterior probability on the left-hand side:
If the definition of entailment in probability were based upon Eq. 10, how robust would the definition be over changes in the prior distribution IL? If !l were not uniform, would the entailment relation change?
It can be shown that, if f-1 is quasi-uniform in the sense that its density has a lower bound greater than zero and an upper bound less than infinity, then the entail ment relation will be unchanged.
In at least some cases, choices of f-1 that are not quasi uniform leave the entailment relation unchanged. An example can be constructed as follows. Imagine ex tending the propositional language C from having r primitive propositions to a language c· having a larger number r+s of primitive propositions. Let M* denote the set of all models for £*. Any model in M • may be converted to a model in M by the appropriate pro jection from 2r+s -dimensional space to 2r -dimensional space. This projection carries a uniform distribution on M* to a Dirichlet distribution on M and this lat ter distribution is not quasi-uniform. But, it follows from Theorem 27 below that entailment in probability is language independent. Therefore, if this particular Dirichlet distribution were chosen as a prior distribu tion on M, the resulting entailment relation would be unchanged.
DEGREE OF RARITY
The next definition defines degree of rarity in terms of entailment with certainty and the succeeding two theorems relate degree of rarity to consistency and to entailment in probability.
Definition 17 For any property p E £, define its de gree of rarity under A by:
Theorem 18 If A is consistent, then r_A(t) = 0. On the other hand, if A is inconsistent, then r.A (t) = oo.
Theorem 19 
Theorem 19 is the key result upon which later theo rems concerning entailment in probability are based.
Theorem 19 is proved by showing that Eq. 8 of Defi ni tion 15 is equivalent to a statement about the support function (Webster, 1994) of the polytope M* . 6(A) 6 DECISION PROCEDURE
DEPTH ENTAILMENT DEFINED
Depth entailment appears, at first, to be a new kind of entailment but it turns out to be equivalent to en tailment in probability.
4This paper uses the convention that oo 2 h+ j if either or both of hand j is oo.
Definition 20 A function d that maps C into the non-negative integers plus oo is called a depth func tion if, for every a, fJ E C,
• d(f) = 00.
A depth function d satisfies a thresholded generaliza tion ')' =?j ( if and only if (12) A depth function satisfies a collection of thresholded generalizations if and only if it satisfies every member of the collection. otherwise.
There exists a smallest non-negative inte
Moreover, if
then D is the smallest non-negative integer such that Thus, the procedure for ascertaining depth entailment is also a procedure for ascertaining entailment in prob ability.
7 RELATION TO SYSTEM-z+ Pearl (1991, 1992; Pearl, 1994) for mulated a System-z+ for reasoning with default rules having varying strengths. In System-z+, a rule has the form o: � (3 where o: and (3 are propositions and k is a non-negative integer. According to Pearl (1994, p. 58) In view of the close relation between entailment in probability, depth entailment, and System-z+, readers wishing to know about the properties of inference in these systems, the complexity of inference, and to see examples should consult Pearl(1991, 1992) .
WHAT'S NEW IN THIS PAPER?
This paper started by proposing a symbolic language having a syntax and semantics similar to that of System-z+. The paper went on to develop the depth entailment relation which, except for special cases, is equivalent to the consequence relations in System-z+. So, what is new in this paper?
There are two new developments. The first new devel opment was that entailment in probability was defined (Definition 15) so that it embodied the modified clas sical criterion for entailment. This criterion asserts a clearly desirable feature for a nonmonotonic entail ment relation: Its conclusions should be probabilisti cally trustworthy meaning that, given true premises, any entailed conclusions should be unlikely to be false. Definition 15 guarantees that conclusions entailed in probability are probabilistically trustworthy.
6 The purpose of this requirement is to guarantee that
Az+ is consistent as defined by Goldszmidt and Pearl (1991, Definition 4).
But, it is not enough to merely define a nonmonotonic entailment relation whose conclusions are probabilisti cally trustworthy. Also needed is a decision procedure for ascertaining whether any given conclusion is en tailed by any given collection of premises. However, from the definition of entailment in probability, it's not obvious what a decision procedure for it would be.
In marked contrast to entailment in probability, the definition of depth entailment leads straightforwardly to a decision procedure. However, the drawback to depth entailment was that it could only be justified by the minimization-of-surprise principle. Although this principle is intuitively appealing, the principle itself is hard to justify. Moreover, this principle does not seem to guarantee the probabilistic trustworthiness of entailed conclusions.
The second new development in this paper was the demonstration (Theorem 27) that entailment in prob ability is identical to depth entailment. By asserting the identity of these two types of entailment, Theo rem 27 simultaneously provides the missing decision procedure for entailment in probability and a stronger justification for depth entailment.
In addition, given the close relation between System z+ and depth entailment, Theorem 27 also puts System-z+ on a more sound footing and shows that its conclusions are probabilistically trustworthy.
